

Data Mining for Cyber Security

Varun Chandola, Eric Eilertson, Levent Ertöz, György Simon and Vipin Kumar

Department of Computer Science, University of Minnesota,
{chandola,eric,ertoz,gsimon,kumar}@cs.umn.edu

Summary. *This chapter provides an overview of the Minnesota Intrusion Detection System (MINDS), which uses a suite of data mining based algorithms to address different aspects of cyber security. The various components of MINDS such as the scan detector, anomaly detector and the profiling module detect different types of attacks and intrusions on a computer network. The scan detector aims at detecting scans which are the precursors to any network attack. The anomaly detection algorithm is very effective in detecting behavioral anomalies in the network traffic which typically translate to malicious activities such as denial-of-service (DoS) traffic, worms, policy violations and inside abuse. The profiling module helps a network analyst to understand the characteristics of the network traffic and detect any deviations from the normal profile. Our analysis shows that the intrusions detected by MINDS are complementary to those of traditional signature based systems, such as SNORT, which implies that they both can be combined to increase overall attack coverage. MINDS has shown great operational success in detecting network intrusions in two live deployments at the University of Minnesota and as a part of the Interrogator architecture at the US Army Research Labs Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection (ARL-CIMP).*

Key words: network intrusion detection, anomaly detection, summarization, profiling, scan detection

The conventional approach to securing computer systems against cyber threats is to design mechanisms such as firewalls, authentication tools, and virtual private networks that create a protective shield. However, these mechanisms almost always have vulnerabilities. They cannot ward off attacks that are continually being adapted to exploit system weaknesses, which are often caused by careless design and implementation flaws. This has created the need for intrusion detection [6], security technology that complements conventional security approaches by monitoring systems and identifying computer attacks.

Traditional intrusion detection methods are based on human experts' extensive knowledge of attack signatures which are character strings in a messages payload

that indicate malicious content. Signatures have several limitations. They cannot detect novel attacks, because someone must manually revise the signature database beforehand for each new type of intrusion discovered. Once someone discovers a new attack and develops its signature, deploying that signature is often delayed. These limitations have led to an increasing interest in intrusion detection techniques based on data mining [12, 22, 2].

This chapter provides an overview of the *Minnesota Intrusion Detection System* (MINDS¹) which is a suite of different data mining based techniques to address different aspects of cyber security. In Section 1 we will discuss the overall architecture of MINDS. In the subsequent sections we will briefly discuss the different components of MINDS which aid in intrusion detection using various data mining approaches.

1 MINDS - Minnesota INtrusion Detection System




Fig. 1. The Minnesota Intrusion Detection System (MINDS)

Figure 1 provides an overall architecture of the MINDS. The MINDS suite contains various modules for collecting and analyzing massive amounts of network traffic. Typical analyses include behavioral anomaly detection, summarization, scan detection and profiling. Additionally, the system has modules for feature extraction and filtering out attacks for which good signatures have been learnt [8]. Each of these modules will be individually described in the subsequent sections. Independently, each of these modules provides key insights into the network. When combined, which MINDS does automatically, these modules have a multiplicative affect on analysis. As shown in the figure, MINDS system is involves a network analyst who provides feedback to each of the modules based on their performance to fine tune them for more accurate analysis.

¹ www.cs.umn.edu/research/minds

While the anomaly detection and scan detection modules aim at detecting actual attacks and other abnormal activities in the network traffic, the profiling module detects the dominant modes of traffic to provide an effective profile of the network to the analyst. The summarization module aims at providing a concise representation of the network traffic and is typically applied to the output of the anomaly detection module to allow the analyst to investigate the anomalous traffic in very few screenshots.

The various modules operate on the network data in the **NetFlow** format by converting the raw network traffic using the *flow-tools* library ². Data in **NetFlow** format is a collection of records, where each record corresponds to a unidirectional flow of packets within a session. Thus each session (also referred to as a connection) between two hosts comprises of two flows in opposite directions. These records are highly compact containing summary information extracted primarily from the packet headers. This information includes source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, number of packets, number of bytes and timestamp. Various modules extract more features from these basic features and apply data mining algorithms on the data set defined over the set of basic as well as derived features.

MINDS is deployed at the University of Minnesota, where several hundred million network flows are recorded from a network of more than 40,000 computers every day. MINDS is also part of the Interrogator [15] architecture at the US Army Research Labs Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection (ARL-CIMP), where analysts collect and analyze network traffic from dozens of Department of Defense sites [7]. MINDS is enjoying great operational success at both sites, routinely detecting brand new attacks that signature-based systems could not have found. Additionally, it often discovers rogue communication channels and the exfiltration of data that other widely used tools such as SNORT [19] have had difficulty identifying.

2 Anomaly Detection

Anomaly detection approaches build models of normal data and detect deviations from the normal model in observed data. Anomaly detection applied to intrusion detection and computer security has been an active area of research since it was originally proposed by Denning [6]. Anomaly detection algorithms have the advantage that they can detect emerging threats and attacks (which do not have signatures or labeled data corresponding to them) as deviations from normal usage. Moreover, unlike misuse detection schemes (which build classification models using labeled data and then classify an observation as normal or attack), anomaly detection algorithms do not require an explicitly labeled training data set, which is very desirable, as labeled data is difficult to obtain in a real network setting.

The MINDS anomaly detection module is a local outlier detection technique based on the *local outlier factor (LOF)* algorithm [3]. The LOF algorithm is effective in detecting outliers in data which has regions of varying densities (such as network data) and has been found to provide competitive performance for network traffic analysis[13].

The input to the anomaly detection algorithm is **NetFlow** data as described in the previous section. The algorithm extracts 8 *derived features* for each flow [8].

² www.splintered.net/sw/flow-tools

Basic	
Source IP	
Source Port	
Destination IP	
Destination Port	
Protocol	
Duration	
Packets Sent	
Bytes per Packet Sent	

Derived (Time-window Based)	
count-dest	Number of flows to unique destination IP addresses inside the network in the last T seconds from the same source
count-src	Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the last T seconds to the same destination
count-serv-src	Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in the last T seconds
count-serv-dest	Number of flows to the destination IP address using same source port in the last T seconds

Derived (Connection Based)	
count-dest-conn	Number of flows to unique destination IP addresses inside the network in the last N flows from the same source
count-src-conn	Number of flows from unique source IP addresses inside the network in the last N flows to the same destination
count-serv-src-conn	Number of flows from the source IP to the same destination port in the last N flows
count-serv-dest-conn	Number of flows to the destination IP address using same source port in the last N flows

Fig. 2. The set of features used by the MINDS anomaly detection algorithm

Figure 2 lists the set of features which are used to represent a network flow in the anomaly detection algorithm. Note that all of these features are either present in the NetFlow data or can be extracted from it without requiring to look at the packet contents.

Applying the LOF algorithm to network data involves computation of similarity between a pair of flows that contain a combination of categorical and numerical features. The anomaly detection algorithm uses a novel data-driven technique for calculating the distance between points in a high-dimensional space. Notably, this technique enables meaningful calculation of the similarity between records containing a mixture of categorical and numerical features shown in Figure 2.

LOF requires the neighborhood around all data points be constructed. This involves calculating pairwise distances between all data points, which is an $O(n^2)$ process, which makes it computationally infeasible for a large number of data points. To address this problem, we sample a training set from the data and compare all data points to this small set, which reduces the complexity to $O(n * m)$ where n is the size of the data and m is the size of the sample. Apart from achieving computational efficiency, sampling also improves the quality of the anomaly detector output. The normal flows are very frequent and the anomalous flows are rare in the actual data. Hence the training data (which is drawn uniformly from the actual data) is more likely to contain several similar normal flows and far less likely to contain a substantial number of similar anomalous flows. Thus an anomalous flow will be unable to find similar anomalous neighbors in the training data and will have a high

LOF score. The normal flows on the other hand will find enough similar normal flows in the training data and will have a low LOF score.

Thus the MINDS anomaly detection algorithm takes as input a set of network flows³ and extracts a random sample as the training set. For each flow in the input data, it then computes its nearest neighbors in the training set. Using the nearest neighbor set it then computes the LOF score (referred to as the *Anomaly Score*) for that particular flow. The flows are then sorted based on their anomaly scores and presented to the analyst in a format described in the next section.

Output of Anomaly Detection Algorithm

The output of the MINDS anomaly detector is in plain text format with each input flow described in a single line. The flows are sorted according to their anomaly scores such that the top flow corresponds to the most anomalous flow (and hence most interesting for the analyst) according to the algorithm. For each flow, its anomaly score and the basic features describing that flow are displayed. Additionally, the contribution of each feature towards the anomaly score is also shown. The contribution of a particular feature signifies how different that flow was from its neighbors in that feature. This allows the analyst to understand the cause of the anomaly in terms of these features.

score	src IP	sPort	dst IP	dPort	protocol	packets	bytes	contribution
20826.69	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.101	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
20344.83	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.110	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
19295.82	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.79	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
18717.1	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.47	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
18147.16	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.183	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
17484.13	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.101	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
16715.61	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.166	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
15973.26	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.102	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
13084.25	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.54	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
12797.73	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.189	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
12428.45	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.247	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
11245.21	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.58	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
9327.98	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.135	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
7468.52	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.91	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
5489.69	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.30	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
5070.5	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.233	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
4558.72	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.1	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
4225.09	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.143	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
4170.72	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.225	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
2937.42	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.75	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
2458.61	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.150	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
1116.41	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.255	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00
1035.17	128.171.X.62	1042	160.94.X.50	1434	tcp	0,2	387,1264	count_src_conn = 1.00

Table 1. Screen-shot of MINDS anomaly detection algorithm output for UofM data for January 25, 2003. The third octet of the IPs is anonymized for privacy preservation.

Table 1 is a screen-shot of the output generated by the MINDS anomaly detector from its live operation at the University of Minnesota. This output is for January

³ Typically, for a large sized network such as the University of Minnesota, data for a 10 minute long window is analyzed together

25, 2003 data which is one day after the **Slammer** worm hit the Internet. All the top 23 flows shown in Table 1 actually correspond to the worm related traffic generated by an external host to different U of M machines on destination port 1434 (which corresponds to the **Slammer** worm). The first entry in each line denotes the anomaly score of that flow. The very high anomaly score for the top flows (the normal flows are assigned a score close to 1), illustrates the strength of the anomaly detection module in separating the anomalous traffic from the normal. Entries 2–7 show the basic features for each flow while the last entry lists all the features which had a significant contribution to the anomaly score. Thus we observe that the anomaly detector detects all worm related traffic as the top anomalies. The contribution vector for each of the flow signifies that these anomalies were caused due to the feature – `count_src_conn`. The anomaly due to this particular feature translates to the fact that the external source was talking to an abnormally high number of inside hosts during a window of certain number of connections.

Table 2 shows another output screen-shot from the University of Minnesota network traffic for **January 26, 2003** data (48 hours after the **Slammer** worm hit the Internet). By this time, the effect of the worm attack was reduced due to preventive measures taken by the network administrators. Table 2 shows the top 32 anomalous flows as ranked by the anomaly detector. Thus while most of the top anomalous flows still correspond to the worm traffic originating from an external host to different U of M machines on destination port 1434, there are two other type of anomalous flows which are highly ranked by the anomaly detector

1. Anomalous flows that correspond to a ping scan by an external host (Bold rows in Table 2)
2. Anomalous flows corresponding to U of M machines connecting to *half-life* game servers (Italicized rows in Table 2)

3 Summarization

The ability to summarize large amounts of network traffic can be highly valuable for network security analysts who must often deal with large amounts of data. For example, when analysts use the MINDS anomaly detection algorithm to score several million network flows in a typical window of data, several hundred highly ranked flows might require attention. But due to the limited time available, analysts often can look only at the first few pages of results covering the top few dozen most anomalous flows. A careful look at the tables 1 and 2 shows that many of the anomalous flows are almost identical. If these similar flows can be condensed into a single line, it will enable the analyst to analyze a much larger set of anomalous flows. For example, the top 32 anomalous flows shown in Table 2 can be represented as a three line summary as shown in Table 3. We observe that every flow is represented in the summary. The first summary represents flows corresponding to the *slammer worm* traffic coming from a single external host and targeting several internal hosts. The second summary represents connections made to *half-life* game servers by an internal host. The third summary corresponds to *ping scans* by different external hosts. Thus an analyst gets a fairly informative picture in just three lines. In general, such summarization has the potential to reduce the size of the data by several orders of magnitude. This motivates the need to summarize the network flows into a smaller

score	src IP	sPort	dst IP	dPort	protocol	packets	bytes	contribution
37674.69	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.29	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
26676.62	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.134	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
24323.55	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.185	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
21169.49	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.71	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
19525.31	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.19	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
19235.39	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.80	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
17679.1	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.220	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
8183.58	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.108	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
7142.98	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.223	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
5139.01	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.142	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
4048.49	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.127	2048	icmp	(2,4)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
<i>4008.35</i>	<i>200.250.Z.20</i>	<i>27016</i>	<i>128.101.X.116</i>	<i>4629</i>	<i>tcp</i>	<i>(2,4)</i>	<i>(0,1829)</i>	count_dst = 1.00
<i>3657.23</i>	<i>202.175.Z.237</i>	<i>27016</i>	<i>128.101.X.116</i>	<i>4148</i>	<i>tcp</i>	<i>(2,4)</i>	<i>(0,1829)</i>	count_dst = 1.00
3450.9	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.62	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
3327.98	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.223	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
2796.13	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.241	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
2693.88	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.168	2048	icmp	(2,4)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
2683.05	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.43	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
2444.16	142.150.X.236	0	128.101.X.240	2048	icmp	(2,4)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
2385.42	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.45	2048	icmp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
2114.41	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.183	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
2057.15	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.161	2048	icmp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
1919.54	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.99	2048	icmp	(2,4)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
1634.38	142.150.X.101	0	128.101.X.219	2048	icmp	(2,4)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
1596.26	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.160	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
1513.96	142.150.X.107	0	128.101.X.2	2048	icmp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
1389.09	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.30	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
1315.88	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.40	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
1279.75	142.150.X.103	0	128.101.X.202	2048	icmp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.69, count_dst_conn = 0.31
1237.97	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.32	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
1180.82	63.150.X.253	1161	128.101.X.61	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34
1107.78	63.150.X.253	1161	160.94.X.154	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)	count_src_conn = 0.66, count_dst_conn = 0.34

Table 2. Screen-shot of MINDS anomaly detection algorithm output for UoFM data for January 26, 2003. The third octet of the IPs is anonymized for privacy preservation.

Average Score	count	src IP	sPort	dst IP	dPort	protocol	packets	bytes
15102	21	63.150.X.253	1161	***	1434	tcp	(0,2)	(0,1829)
3833	2	***	27016	128.101.X.116	***	tcp	(2,4)	(0,1829)
3371	11	***	0	***	2048	icmp	***	(0,1829)

Table 3. A three line summary of the 32 anomalous flows in Table 2. The column *count* indicates the number of flows represented by a line. “***” indicates that the set of flows represented by the line had several distinct values for this feature.

but meaningful representation. We have formulated a methodology for summarizing information in a database of transactions with categorical features as an optimization problem [4]. We formulate the problem of summarization of transactions that contain categorical data, as a dual-optimization problem and characterize a good summary using two metrics – *compaction gain* and *information loss*. Compaction gain signifies the amount of reduction done in the transformation from the actual data to a summary. Information loss is defined as the total amount of information missing over all original data transactions in the summary. We have developed several heuristic algorithms which use frequent itemsets from the association analysis domain [1] as the candidate set for individual summaries and select a subset of these frequent itemsets to represent the original set of transactions.

The MINDS summarization module [8] is one such heuristic-based algorithm based on the above optimization framework. The input to the summarization module is the set of network flows which are scored by the anomaly detector. The summarization algorithm first generates frequent itemsets from these network flows (treating each flow as a transaction). It then greedily searches for a subset of these frequent itemsets such that the information loss incurred by the flows in the resulting summary is minimal. The summarization algorithm is further extended in MINDS by incorporating the ranks associated with the flows (based on the anomaly score). The underlying idea is that the highly ranked flows should incur very little loss, while the low ranked flows can be summarized in a more lossy manner. Furthermore, summaries that represent many anomalous flows (high scores) but few normal flows (low scores) are preferred. This is a desirable feature for the network analysts while summarizing the anomalous flows.

The summarization algorithm enables the analyst to better understand the nature of cyberattacks as well as create new signature rules for intrusion detection systems. Specifically, the MINDS summarization component compresses the anomaly detection output into a compact representation, so analysts can investigate numerous anomalous activities in a single screen-shot. Table 4 illustrates a typical MINDS output after anomaly detection and summarization. Each line contains the average anomaly score, the number of anomalous and normal flows represented by the line, eight basic flow features, and the relative contribution of each basic and derived anomaly detection feature. For example, the second line in Table 4 represents a total of 150 connections, of which 138 are highly anomalous. From this summary, analysts can easily infer that this is a backscatter from a denial-of-service attack on a computer that is outside the network being examined. Note that if an analyst looks at any one of these flows individually, it will be hard to infer that the flow belongs to back scatter even if the anomaly score is available. Similarly, lines 7, 17, 18, 19 together represent a total of 215 anomalous and 13 normal flows that represent summaries of FTP scans of the U of M network by an external host (200.75.X.2).

Line 10 is a summary of IDENT lookups, where a remote computer is trying to get the user name of an account on an internal machine. Such inference is hard to make from individual flows even if the anomaly detection module ranks them highly.

4 Profiling Network Traffic Using Clustering

Clustering is a widely used data mining technique [10, 24] which groups similar items, to obtain meaningful groups/clusters of data items in a data set. These clusters represent the dominant modes of behavior of the data objects determined using a similarity measure. A data analyst can get a high level understanding of the characteristics of the data set by analyzing the clusters. Clustering provides an effective solution to discover the expected and unexpected modes of behavior and to obtain a high level understanding of the network traffic.

The profiling module of MINDS essentially performs clustering, to find related network connections and thus discover dominant modes of behavior. MINDS uses the Shared Nearest Neighbor (SNN) clustering algorithm [9], which can find clusters of varying shapes, sizes and densities, even in the presence of noise and outliers. The algorithm can also handle data of high dimensionalities, and can automatically determine the number of clusters. Thus SNN is well-suited for network data. SNN is highly computationally intensive — of the order $O(n^2)$, where n is the number of network connections. We have developed a parallel formulation of the SNN clustering algorithm for behavior modeling, making it feasible to analyze massive amounts of network data.

An experiment we ran on a real network illustrates this approach as well as the computational power required to run SNN clustering on network data at a DoD site [7]. The data consisted of 850,000 connections collected over one hour. On a 16-CPU cluster, the SNN algorithm took 10 hours to run and required 100 Mbytes of memory at each node to calculate distances between points. The final clustering step required 500 Mbytes of memory at one node. The algorithm produced 3,135 clusters ranging in size from 10 to 500 records. Most large clusters correspond to normal behavior modes, such as virtual private network traffic. However, several smaller clusters correspond to deviant behavior modes that highlight misconfigured computers, insider abuse, and policy violations that are difficult to detect by manual inspection of network traffic.

Table 5 shows three such clusters obtained from this experiment. Cluster in Table 5(a) represents connections from inside machines to a site called `GoToMyPC.com`, which allows users (or attackers) to control desktops remotely. This is a policy violation in the organization for which this data was being analyzed. Cluster in Table 5(b) represents mysterious *ping* and SNMP traffic where a mis-configured internal machine is subjected to SNMP surveillance. Cluster in Table 5(c) represents traffic involving suspicious repeated *ftp* sessions. In this case, further investigations revealed that a mis-configured internal machine was trying to contact Microsoft. Such clusters give analysts information they can act on immediately and can help them understand their network traffic behavior.

Table 6 shows a sample of interesting clusters obtained by performing a similar experiment on a sample of 7500 network flows sampled from the University of Minnesota network data. The first two clusters (Tables 6(a) and 6(b)) represent `Kazaa` (P2P) traffic between a UofM machine and different external P2P clients. Since

(a)

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
10:00:10.428036	0:00:00	A	4125	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:00:40.685520	0:00:03	A	4127	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:00:58.748920	0:00:00	A	4138	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:01:44.138057	0:00:00	A	4141	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:01:59.267932	0:00:00	A	4143	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:02:44.937575	0:00:01	A	4149	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:04:00.717395	0:00:00	A	4163	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:04:30.976627	0:00:01	A	4172	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:04:46.106233	0:00:00	A	4173	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:05:46.715539	0:00:00	A	4178	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:06:16.975202	0:00:01	A	4180	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:06:32.105013	0:00:00	A	4181	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:07:32.624600	0:00:00	A	4185	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:08:18.013525	0:00:00	A	4188	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:08:48.273214	0:00:00	A	4190	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:09:03.642970	0:00:00	A	4191	B	8200	tcp	5	248
10:09:33.902846	0:00:01	A	4193	B	8200	tcp	5	248

(b)

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
10:01:00.181261	0:00:00	A	1176	B	161	udp	1	95
10:01:23.183183	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:02:54.182861	0:00:00	A	1514	B	161	udp	1	95
10:03:03.196850	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:04:45.179841	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:06:27.180037	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:09:48.420365	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:11:04.420353	0:00:00	A	3013	B	161	udp	1	95
10:11:30.420766	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:12:47.421054	0:00:00	A	3329	B	161	udp	1	95
10:13:12.423653	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:14:53.420635	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:16:33.420625	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:18:15.423915	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:19:57.421333	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:21:38.421085	0:00:00	A	-1	B	-1	icmp	1	84
10:21:57.422743	0:00:00	A	1049	B	161	udp	1	168

(c)

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
10:10:57.097108	0:00:00	A	3004	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:11:27.113230	0:00:00	A	3007	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:11:37.111176	0:00:00	A	3008	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:11:57.118231	0:00:00	A	3011	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:12:17.125220	0:00:00	A	3013	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:12:37.132428	0:00:00	A	3015	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:13:17.146391	0:00:00	A	3020	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:13:37.153713	0:00:00	A	3022	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:14:47.178228	0:00:00	A	3031	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:15:47.199100	0:00:00	A	3040	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:16:07.206450	0:00:00	A	3042	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:16:47.220403	0:00:00	A	3047	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:17:17.231042	0:00:00	A	3050	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:17:27.234578	0:00:00	A	3051	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:17:37.241179	0:00:00	A	3052	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:17:47.241807	0:00:00	A	3054	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:17:57.247902	0:00:00	A	3055	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:19:07.269827	0:00:00	A	3063	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:19:27.276831	0:00:00	A	3065	B	21	tcp	7	318
10:20:07.291046	0:00:00	A	3072	B	21	tcp	7	318

Table 5. Clusters obtained from network traffic at a US Army Fort, representing (a) connections to GoToMyPC.com, (b) mis-configured computers subjected to SNMP surveillance and (c) a mis-configured computer trying to contact Microsoft

Kazaa usage is not allowed in the university, this cluster brings forth an anomalous profile for the network analyst to investigate. Cluster in Table 6(c) represents traffic involving bulk data transfers between internal and external hosts; i.e. this cluster covers traffic in which the number of packets and bytes are much larger than the normal values for the involved IPs and ports. Cluster in Table 6(d) represents traffic between different U of M hosts and *Hotmail* servers (characterized by the port 1863). Cluster in Table 6(e) represents *ftp* traffic in which the data transferred is low. This cluster has different machines connecting to different *ftp* servers all of which are transferring much lower amount of data than the usual values for *ftp* traffic. A key observation to be made is that the clustering algorithm automatically determines the dimensions of interest in different clusters. In clusters of Table 6(a),6(b), the protocol, source port and the number of bytes are similar. In cluster of Table 6(c) the only common characteristic is large number of bytes. The common characteristics in cluster of Table 6(d) are the protocol and the source port. In cluster of Table 6(e) the common features are the protocol, source port and the low number of packets transferred.

5 Scan Detection

A precursor to many attacks on networks is often a reconnaissance operation, more commonly referred to as a scan. Identifying what attackers are scanning for can alert a system administrator or security analyst to what services or types of computers are being targeted. Knowing what services are being targeted before an attack allows an administrator to take preventative measures to protect the resources e.g. installing patches, firewalling services from the outside, or removing services on machines which do not need to be running them.

Given its importance, the problem of scan detection has been given a lot of attention by a large number of researchers in the network security community. Initial solutions simply counted the number of destination IPs that a source IP made connection attempts to on each destination port and declared every source IP a scanner whose count exceeded a threshold [19]. Many enhancements have been proposed recently [23, 11, 18, 14, 17, 16], but despite the vast amount of expert knowledge spent on these methods, current, state-of-the-art solutions still suffer from high percentage of false alarms or low ratio of scan detection. For example, a recently developed scheme by Jung [11] has better performance than many earlier methods, but its performance is dependent on the selection of the thresholds. If a high threshold is selected, TRW will report only very few false alarms, but its coverage will not be satisfactory. Decreasing the threshold will increase the coverage, but only at the cost of introducing false alarms. P2P traffic and backscatter have patterns that are similar to scans, as such traffic results in many unsuccessful connection attempts from the same source to several destinations. Hence such traffic leads to false alarms by many existing scan detection schemes.

MINDS uses a data-mining-based approach to scan detection. Here we present an overview of this scheme and show that an off-the-shelf classifier, Ripper [5], can achieve outstanding performance both in terms of missing only very few scanners and also in terms of very low false alarm rate. Additional details are available in [20, 21].

(a) Cluster representing *Kazaa* traffic between a UofM host and external machines

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
1021.03:49:24.854	0:14:44	128.101.X.46	3531	69.3.X.173	3015	tcp	20	857
1021.03:49:37.167	0:14:54	128.101.X.46	3531	62.201.X.143	4184	tcp	19	804
1021.03:49:57.223	0:14:17	128.101.X.46	3531	24.197.X.13	10272	tcp	17	701
1021.03:49:57.224	0:17:00	128.101.X.46	3531	209.204.X.46	4238	tcp	20	835
1021.03:52:07.707	0:13:33	128.101.X.46	3531	24.153.X.185	2008	tcp	15	620

(b) Cluster representing *Kazaa* traffic between a UofM host and external machines

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
1021.03:49:34.399	0:14:08	128.101.X.139	3531	66.68.X.95	2422	tcp	19	804
1021.03:49:39.215	0:15:07	128.101.X.139	3531	24.81.X.107	56782	tcp	19	814
1021.03:49:44.975	0:15:05	128.101.X.139	3531	65.100.X.201	62654	tcp	22	998
1021.03:49:49.447	0:12:06	128.101.X.139	3531	212.126.X.39	1125	tcp	19	814
1021.03:49:52.759	0:14:44	128.101.X.139	3531	68.165.X.144	3208	tcp	17	706
1021.03:49:53.059	0:14:13	128.101.X.139	3531	151.204.X.207	3712	tcp	20	855
1021.03:49:55.311	0:10:05	128.101.X.139	3531	213.190.X.198	1113	tcp	19	796
1021.03:49:56.771	0:14:30	128.101.X.139	3531	68.59.X.92	4904	tcp	20	857

(c) Cluster representing bulk data transfer between different hosts

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
1021.03:36:53.116	0:31:07	160.94.X.7	2819	61.104.X.142	4242	tcp	3154	129490
1021.03:43:43.575	0:20:24	66.163.X.112	5100	134.84.X.91	1224	tcp	2196	1217668
1021.03:49:20.880	0:18:42	81.129.X.96	6881	134.84.X.14	1594	tcp	3200	4399254
1021.03:50:21.403	0:15:08	211.180.X.131	4670	160.94.X.7	21	tcp	2571	3330750
1021.03:52:49.530	0:10:20	195.29.X.70	27568	160.94.X.50	63144	tcp	2842	113680
1021.03:54:32.854	0:09:00	24.147.X.216	6881	128.101.X.1191	5371	tcp	2677	115353
1021.03:58:14.788	0:09:29	160.94.X.198	6883	24.91.X.133	61259	tcp	2162	2960699
1021.04:00:26.606	0:00:21	128.101.X.11	60297	128.183.X.167	20	tcp	3566	142648

(d) Cluster representing traffic between U of M hosts and *Hotmail* servers

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
03:58:56.069	00:00:00	207.46.106.183	1863	128.101.169.37	3969	tcp	1	41
03:59:18.521	00:00:30	207.46.108.59	1863	128.101.248.166	1462	tcp	4	189
04:00:04.001	00:00:00	207.46.106.151	1863	134.84.5.26	3963	tcp	1	41
04:00:36.910	00:00:00	207.46.107.39	1863	134.84.255.18	4493	tcp	1	41
04:00:59.570	00:00:00	207.46.106.3	1863	128.101.169.165	2869	tcp	1	92
04:02:56.103	00:00:00	207.46.106.188	1863	134.84.255.22	4715	tcp	1	41
04:03:39.646	00:00:00	207.46.106.151	1863	134.84.5.26	3963	tcp	1	475
04:03:59.178	00:00:50	207.46.106.97	1863	128.101.35.20	1102	tcp	4	176
04:04:22.871	00:00:00	207.46.106.14	1863	134.84.254.126	3368	tcp	1	41
04:04:23.287	00:00:42	207.46.107.20	1863	134.84.19.136	4942	tcp	4	176
04:04:58.611	00:00:02	207.46.106.155	1863	128.101.248.19	3805	tcp	9	705
04:04:59.683	00:00:00	207.46.106.83	1863	128.101.165.97	2763	tcp	1	41
04:05:21.099	00:00:00	207.46.106.59	1863	128.101.21.81	63910	tcp	1	41
04:05:24.395	00:00:00	207.46.106.164	1863	134.84.224.3	4062	tcp	1	41
04:05:34.335	00:00:46	207.46.106.97	1863	128.101.35.20	1102	tcp	6	256
04:07:49.164	00:00:00	207.46.106.29	1863	160.94.156.171	3170	tcp	1	41

(e) Cluster representing FTP traffic with small payload

Start Time	Duration	Src IP	Src Port	Dst IP	Dst Port	Proto	Pkt	Bytes
03:58:32.117	00:00:02	128.101.36.204	21	155.210.211.122	1280	tcp	13	1046
04:00:02.326	00:00:05	128.101.36.204	21	12.255.198.216	34781	tcp	18	1532
04:00:53.726	00:00:11	128.101.25.35	21	62.101.126.201	9305	tcp	13	1185
04:02:54.718	00:00:00	128.101.36.204	21	62.101.126.217	27408	tcp	2	144
04:05:31.784	00:00:10	128.101.36.204	21	213.170.40.147	10029	tcp	3	144
04:07:00.800	00:00:01	38.117.149.172	21	134.84.191.5	2968	tcp	10	649
04:07:03.440	00:00:03	128.101.36.204	21	210.162.100.225	7512	tcp	13	998
04:08:05.649	00:00:00	66.187.224.51	21	134.84.64.243	45607	tcp	4	227

Table 6. Five clusters obtained from University of Minnesota network traffic




Fig. 3. Transformation of raw netflow data in an observation window to the Summary Data Set. Features are constructed using the set of netflows in the observation window. Labels for use in the training and test sets are constructed by analyzing the data over a long period (usually several days)

Methodology

Currently our solution is a batch-mode implementation that analyzes data in windows of 20 minutes. For each 20-minute observation period, we transform the **NetFlow** data into a **summary data** set. Figure 3 depicts this process. With our focus on incoming scans, each new **summary record** corresponds to a potential scanner—that is pair of external source IP and destination port (SIDP). For each SIDP, the summary record contains a set of features constructed from the raw netflows available during the observation window. Observation window size of 20 minutes is somewhat arbitrary. It needs to be large enough to generate features that have reliable values, but short enough so that the construction of summary records does not take too much time or memory.

Given a set of summary data records corresponding to an observation period, scan detection can be viewed as a classification problem [24] in which each SIDP, whose source IP is external to the network being observed, is labeled as **scanner** if it was found scanning or **non-scanner** otherwise. This classification problem can be solved using predictive modeling techniques developed in the data mining and machine learning community if class labels (**scanner/non-scanner**) are available for a set of SIDPs that can be used as a training set.

Figure 4 depicts the overall paradigm. Each SIDP in the summary data set for an observation period (typically 20 minutes) is labeled by analyzing the behavior of the source IPs over a period of several days. Once a training set is constructed, a predictive model is built using Ripper. The Ripper generated model can now be used on any summary data set to produce labels of SIDPs.

The success of this method depends on (1) whether we can label the data accurately and (2) whether we have derived the right set of features that facilitate the extraction of knowledge. In the following sections, we will elaborate on these points.

Features: The key challenge in designing a data mining method for a concrete




Fig. 4. Scan Detection using an off-the-shelf classifier, Ripper. **Building a predictive model:** 20 minutes of NetFlow data is converted into unlabeled Summary Record format, which is labeled by the Labeler using several days of data. Predictive model is built on the labeled Summary Records. **Scan Detection:** 20 minutes of data is converted into unlabeled Summary Record format. The predictive model is applied to it resulting in a list of predicted scanners.

application is the necessity to integrate the expert knowledge into the method. A part of the knowledge integration is the derivation of the appropriate features. We make use of two types of expert knowledge. The first type of knowledge consists of a list of inactive IPs, a set of blocked ports and a list of P2P hosts in the network being monitored. This knowledge may be available to the security analyst or can be simply constructed by analyzing the network traffic data over a long period (several weeks or months). Since this information does not change rapidly, this analysis can be done relatively infrequently. The second type of knowledge captures the behavior of $\langle \text{source IP, destination port} \rangle$ (SIDP) pairs, based on the 20-minute observation window. Some of these features only use the second type of knowledge, and others use both types of knowledge.

Labeling the Data Set: The goal of labeling is to generate a data set that can be used as training data set for Ripper. Given a set of summarized records corresponding to 20-minutes of observation with unknown labels (unknown scanning statuses), the goal is to determine the actual labels with very high confidence. The problem of computing the labels is very similar to the problem of scan detection except that we have the flexibility to observe the behavior of an SIDP over a long period. This makes it possible to declare certain SIDPs as **scanner** or **non-scanner** with great confidence in many cases. For example, if a source IP s_ip makes a few failed connection attempts on a specific port in a short time window, it may be hard to declare it a scanner. But if the behavior of s_ip can be observed over a long period of time (e.g. few days), it can be labeled as **non-scanner** (if it mostly makes successful connections on this port) or **scanner** (if most of its connection attempts are to destinations that never offered service on this port). However, there will situations, in which the above analysis does not offer any clear-cut evidence one way or the other. In such cases, we label the SIDP as **dontknow**. For additional details

on the labeling method, the reader is referred to [20].

Evaluation

For our experiments, we used real-world network trace data collected at the University of Minnesota between the 1st and the 22nd March, 2005. The University of Minnesota network consists of 5 class-B networks with many autonomous sub-networks. Most of the IP space is allocated, but many subnetworks have inactive IPs. We collected information about inactive IPs and P2P hosts over 22 days, and we used flows in 20 minute windows during 03/21/2005 (Mon.) and 03/22/2005 (Tue.) for constructing summary records for the experiments. We took samples of 20-minute duration every 3 hours starting at midnight on March 21. A model was built for each of the 13 periods and tested on the remaining 12 periods. This allowed us to reduce possible dependence on a certain time of the day, and performed our experiments on each sample.

Table 7 describes the traffic in terms of number of <source IP, destination port> (SIDP) combinations pertaining to scanning-, P2P-, normal- and backscatter traffic.

Table 7. The distribution of (source IP, destination ports) (SIDPs) over the various traffic types for each traffic sample produced by our labeling method

ID	Day.Time	Total	scan	p2p	normal	backscatter	dont-know
01	0321.0000	67522	3984	28911	6971	4431	23225
02	0321.0300	53333	5112	19442	9190	1544	18045
03	0321.0600	56242	5263	19485	8357	2521	20616
04	0321.0900	78713	5126	32573	10590	5115	25309
05	0321.1200	93557	4473	38980	12354	4053	33697
06	0321.1500	85343	3884	36358	10191	5383	29527
07	0321.1800	92284	4723	39738	10488	5876	31459
08	0321.2100	82941	4273	39372	8816	1074	29406
09	0322.0000	69894	4480	33077	5848	1371	25118
10	0322.0300	63621	4953	26859	4885	4993	21931
11	0322.0600	60703	5629	25436	4467	3241	21930
12	0322.0900	78608	4968	33783	7520	4535	27802
13	0322.1200	91741	4130	43473	6319	4187	33632

In our experimental evaluation, we provide comparison to TRW [11], as it is one of the state-of-the-art schemes. With the purpose of applying TRW for scanning worm containment, Weaver et al. [25] proposed a number of simplifications so that TRW can be implemented in hardware. One of the simplifications they applied—without significant loss of quality—is to perform the sequential hypothesis testing in logarithmic space. TRW then can be modeled as counting: a counter is assigned to each source IP and this counter is incremented upon a failed connection attempt and decremented upon a successful connection establishment.

Our implementation of TRW used in this paper for comparative evaluation draws from the above ideas. If the count exceeds a certain positive threshold, we declare the source to be scanner, and if the counter falls below a negative threshold, we declare the source to be normal.

The performance of a classifier is measured in terms of precision, recall and F-measure. For a contingency table of

	classified as	
	Scanner	not Scanner
actual Scanner	TP	FN
actual not Scanner	FP	TN

$$\text{precision} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FP}}$$

$$\text{recall} = \frac{\text{TP}}{\text{TP} + \text{FN}}$$

$$\text{F - measure} = \frac{2 * \text{prec} * \text{recall}}{\text{prec} + \text{recall}}.$$

Less formally, precision measures the percentage of scanning (source IP, destination port)-pairs (SIDPs) among the SIDPs that got declared scanners; recall measures the percentage of the actual scanners that were discovered; F-measure balances between precision and recall.

To obtain a high-level view of the performance of our scheme, we built a model on the 0321.0000 data set (ID 1) and tested it on the remaining 12 data sets. Figure 5 depicts the performance of our proposed scheme and that of TRW on the same data sets ⁴.

One can see that not only does our proposed scheme outperform TRW by a wide margin, it is also more stable: the performance varies less from data set to data set (the boxes in Figure 5 appear much smaller).

Figure 6 shows the actual values of precision, recall and F-measure for the different data sets. The performance in terms of F-measure is consistently above 90% with very high precision, which is important, because high false alarm rates can rapidly deteriorate the usability of a system. The only jitter occurs on data set # 7 and it was caused by a single source IP that scanned a single destination host on 614(!) different destination ports meanwhile touching only 4 blocked ports. This source IP got misclassified as P2P, since touching many destination ports (on a number of IPs) is characteristic of P2P. This single misclassification introduced 614 false negatives (recall that we are classifying SIDPs not source IPs). The reason for the misclassification is that there were no vertical scanners in the training set — the highest number of destination ports scanned by a single source IP was 8, and this source IP touched over 47 destination IPs making it primarily a horizontal scanner.

⁴ The authors of TRW recommend a threshold of 4. In our experiments, we found, that TRW can achieve better performance (in terms of F-measure) when we set the threshold to 2, this is the threshold that was used in Figure 5, too.




Fig. 5. Performance comparison between the proposed scheme and TRW. From left to right, the six box plots correspond to the precision, recall and F-measure of our proposed scheme and the precision, recall and F-measure of TRW. Each box plot has three lines corresponding (from top downwards) to the upper quartile, median and lower quartile of the performance values obtained over the 13 data sets. The whiskers depict the best and worst performance.




Fig. 6. The performance of the proposed scheme on the 13 data sets in terms of precision (topmost line), F-measure (middle line) and recall (bottom line). The model was built on data set ID 1.

6 Conclusion

MINDS is a suite of data mining algorithms which can be used as a tool by network analysts to defend the network against attacks and emerging cyber threats. The various components of MINDS such as the scan detector, anomaly detector and the profiling module detect different types of attacks and intrusions on a computer network. The scan detector aims at detecting scans which are the precursors to any network attack. The anomaly detection algorithm is very effective in detecting behavioral anomalies in the network traffic which typically translate to malicious activities such as *dos* traffic, worms, policy violations and inside abuse. The profiling module helps a network analyst to understand the characteristics of the network traffic and detect any deviations from the normal profile. Our analysis shows that

the intrusions detected by MINDS are complementary to those of traditional signature based systems, such as SNORT, which implies that they both can be combined to increase overall attack coverage. MINDS has shown great operational success in detecting network intrusions in two live deployments at the University of Minnesota and as a part of the Interrogator [15] architecture at the US Army Research Labs Center for Intrusion Monitoring and Protection (ARL-CIMP).

7 Acknowledgements

This work is supported by ARDA grant AR/F30602-03-C-0243, NSF grants IIS-0308264 and ACI-0325949, and the US Army High Performance Computing Research Center under contract DAAD19-01-2-0014. The research reported in this article was performed in collaboration with Paul Dokas, Yongdae Kim, Aleksandar Lazarevic, Haiyang Liu, Mark Shaneck, Jaideep Srivastava, Michael Steinbach, Pang-Ning Tan, and Zhi-li Zhang. Access to computing facilities was provided by the AHPCRC and the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute.

References

1. Rakesh Agrawal, Tomasz Imieliski, and Arun Swami. Mining association rules between sets of items in large databases. In *Proceedings of the 1993 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data*, pages 207–216. ACM Press, 1993.
2. Daniel Barbara and Sushil Jajodia, editors. *Applications of Data Mining in Computer Security*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, MA, USA, 2002.
3. Markus M. Breunig, Hans-Peter Kriegel, Raymond T. Ng, and J Sander. Lof: identifying density-based local outliers. In *Proceedings of the 2000 ACM SIGMOD international conference on Management of data*, pages 93–104. ACM Press, 2000.
4. Varun Chandola and Vipin Kumar. Summarization – compressing data into an informative representation. In *Fifth IEEE International Conference on Data Mining*, pages 98–105, Houston, TX, November 2005.
5. William W. Cohen. Fast effective rule induction. In *International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, 1995.
6. Dorothy E. Denning. An intrusion-detection model. *IEEE Trans. Softw. Eng.*, 13(2):222–232, 1987.
7. Eric Eilertson, Levent Ertöz, Vipin Kumar, and Kerry Long. Minds – a new approach to the information security process. In *24th Army Science Conference*. US Army, 2004.
8. Levent Ertöz, Eric Eilertson, Aleksander Lazarevic, Pang-Ning Tan, Vipin Kumar, Jaideep Srivastava, and Paul Dokas. MINDS - Minnesota Intrusion Detection System. In *Data Mining - Next Generation Challenges and Future Directions*. MIT Press, 2004.
9. Levent Ertöz, Michael Steinbach, and Vipin Kumar. Finding clusters of different sizes, shapes, and densities in noisy, high dimensional data. In *Proceedings of 3rd SIAM International Conference on Data Mining*, May 2003.

10. Anil K. Jain and Richard C. Dubes. *Algorithms for Clustering Data*. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1988.
11. Jaeyeon Jung, Vern Paxson, Arthur W. Berger, and Hari Balakrishnan. Fast portscan detection using sequential hypothesis testing. In *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, 2004.
12. Vipin Kumar, Jaideep Srivastava, and Aleksander Lazarevic, editors. *Managing Cyber Threats—Issues, Approaches and Challenges*. Springer Verlag, May 2005.
13. Aleksandar Lazarevic, Levent Ertöz, Vipin Kumar, Aysel Ozgur, and Jaideep Srivastava. A comparative study of anomaly detection schemes in network intrusion detection. In *SIAM Conference on Data Mining (SDM)*, 2003.
14. C. Lickie and R. Kotagiri. A probabilistic approach to detecting network scans. In *Eighth IEEE Network Operations and Management*, 2002.
15. Kerry Long. Catching the cyber-spy, arl’s interrogator. In *24th Army Science Conference*. US Army, 2004.
16. V. Paxon. Bro: a system for detecting network intruders in real-time. In *Eighth IEEE Network Operators and Management Symposium (NOMS)*, 2002.
17. Phillip A. Porras and Alfonso Valdes. Live traffic analysis of tcp/ip gateways. In *NDSS*, 1998.
18. Seth Robertson, Eric V. Siegel, Matt Miller, and Salvatore J. Stolfo. Surveillance detection in high bandwidth environments. In *DARPA DISCEX III Conference*, 2003.
19. Martin Roesch. Snort: Lightweight intrusion detection for networks. In *LISA*, pages 229–238, 1999.
20. Gyorgy Simon, Hui Xiong, Eric Eilertson, and Vipin Kumar. Scan detection: A data mining approach. Technical Report AHPCRC 038, University of Minnesota – Twin Cities, 2005.
21. Gyorgy Simon, Hui Xiong, Eric Eilertson, and Vipin Kumar. Scan detection: A data mining approach. In *Proceedings of SIAM Conference on Data Mining (SDM)*, 2006.
22. Anoop Singhal and Sushil Jajodia. Data mining for intrusion detection. In *Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery Handbook*, pages 1225–1237. Springer, 2005.
23. Stuart Staniford, James A. Hoagland, and Joseph M. McAlerney. Practical automated detection of stealthy portscans. *Journal of Computer Security*, 10(1/2):105–136, 2002.
24. Pang-Ning Tan, Michael Steinbach, and Vipin Kumar. *Introduction to Data Mining*. Addison-Wesley, May 2005.
25. Nicholas Weaver, Stuart Staniford, and Vern Paxson. Very fast containment of scanning worms. In *13th USENIX Security Symposium*, 2004.